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in global economic management and economic 
governance. Each Committee report will focus on 
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rather than conjunctural policy issues. 
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Executive Summary
T
his report lays out a framework for rethink-
ing central banking in light of lessons learned 
in the lead-up to and aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. 
By the early 2000s, a growing number of central 
banks, in advanced countries and emerging mar-
kets alike, had converged on a policy framework, 
flexible inflation targeting, which seemed capable 
of achieving price stability and delivering mac-
roeconomic stability at the national and interna-
tional levels. This framework had many practical 
achievements, including bringing price stability 
to many emerging markets. Now, however, there 
is growing recognition that the conventional ap-
proach to central banking needs to be rethought.
The relationship between price stability and the 
broader goals of macroeconomic and financial sta-
bility clearly needs to be redefined. Moreover, the 
evolution of monetary and exchange rate regimes 
has resulted in incompatibilities among the poli-
cies of some key countries. Central banks are also 
being pulled into new roles by the post-crisis envi-
ronment, which features high levels of public and 
private debt in advanced economies and concerns 
about capital inflows and currency appreciation 
in emerging markets. While some aspects of these 
roles are not new, they are risky, as central bank 
actions can inflict collateral damage on domestic 
financial systems and have the potential of raising 
new domestic and international tensions. 
The report analyzes these issues from academ-
ic and practical policy-oriented perspectives. 
Drawing on this analysis, it recommends changes 
to the dominant framework guiding central bank-
ing practice. 
The first recommendation is that central banks 
should go beyond their traditional emphasis on 
low inflation to adopt an explicit goal of financial 
stability. Macroprudential tools should be used 
alongside monetary policy in pursuit of that ob-
jective. Mechanisms should also be developed to 
encourage large-country central banks to inter-
nalize the spillover effects of their policies. Spe-
cifically, we call for the creation of an International 
Monetary Policy Committee composed of repre-
sentatives of major central banks that will report 
regularly to world leaders on the aggregate conse-
quences of individual central bank policies. 
There is substantial pressure on central banks to 
acknowledge the importance of still other issues, 
such as the high costs of public debt management 
and the level of the exchange rate. Central banks 
are more likely to safeguard their independence 
and credibility by acknowledging and explicitly 
addressing the tensions between inflation target-
ing and competing objectives than by denying 
such linkages and proceeding with business as 
usual. Central banks should make clear that mon-
etary policy is only one part of the policy response 
and cannot be effective unless other policies—fis-
cal and structural policies, financial sector regula-
tion—work in tandem.
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The Golden Age of Inflation Targeting
High inflation in the advanced economies in the 
1970s and in emerging economies in the 1980s and 
1990s was instrumental in shaping modern think-
ing about the practice of central banking. The tenets 
of the resulting framework are familiar and, to a 
large extent, uncontroversial. First, there is no per-
manent tradeoff between inflation and unemploy-
ment—a sustained higher level of inflation does not 
lead to higher growth and a sustained lower level of 
unemployment. Second, high and volatile inflation 
depresses growth and distorts the allocation of re-
sources. Third, inflation disproportionately harms 
the poorest segments of society, which lack instru-
ments for protecting themselves from its disruptive 
effects. For all of these reasons, price stability is the 
cornerstone of monetary policy. 
The actions needed to achieve price stability, such 
as the maintenance of high interest rates, can be 
politically unpopular, among other reasons be-
cause they slow growth. It follows that the pur-
suit of price stability can be made more credible 
and thus more effective by granting independence 
or at least operational autonomy to the central 
bank. Otherwise, central banks may be subject to 
political pressure to attach greater weight to other 
objectives, making it harder for them to contain 
inflationary expectations and deliver desirable 
outcomes.
By the early 2000s, a growing number of central 
banks, in advanced countries and emerging mar-
kets alike, had converged on a policy framework, 
flexible inflation targeting, that seemed capable of 
achieving these desiderata and delivering macro-
economic stability at the national and internation-
al levels. In the conventional view, there are four 
explanations for this happy outcome:
•	 Flexible inflation targeting, under which 
the central bank aims to stabilize inflation 
around its target but also minimize the 
output gap, delivers low inflation at the 
national level, thereby avoiding the need 
for large nominal exchange-rate adjust-
ments and the kind of overshooting that 
characterized the 1980s.1
•	 Flexible inflation targeting, by allowing 
for exchange rate variability, facilitates in-
ternational adjustment. Countries experi-
encing demand shocks can cushion them 
1  Although neither the Fed nor the ECB had formally endorsed inflation targeting (IT), both were aiming at price stability, which made their 
policies similar to those of the central banks on a strict IT regime.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
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through interest-rate changes and associ-
ated movements in exchange rates. 
•	 Flexible inflation targeting makes re-
serve accumulation unnecessary, since 
exchange-rate intervention is rare and 
limited to short-term responses to market 
disruptions and to a signaling role in cases 
of serious misalignments. 
•	 The combined policy stance of the coun-
tries following this strategy is supposed to 
ensure an appropriate level of aggregate 
demand at the global level. 
The generalization of inflation targeting cum float-
ing exchange rates could thus be regarded as the 
triumph of the “own house in order” doctrine in 
the international monetary field. National macro-
economic stability was seen as sufficient for inter-
national macroeconomic stability. The domestic 
and international aspects were essentially regarded 
as two sides of the same coin.2
An added benefit of flexible inflation targeting, 
according to the emerging orthodoxy, was that it 
allowed the objectives of price stability and finan-
cial stability to be pursued through separate tools 
—monetary policy for the former and micro-pru-
dential regulatory and supervisory measures for 
the latter. Tinbergen’s separation principle, i.e. the 
idea that each goal should be pursued with a sepa-
rate and dedicated instrument, was widely invoked 
in this context.
In this orthodox view, monetary policy focuses 
on controlling inflation and works by managing 
expectations of future policy rates, which by the 
expectations theory of the yield curve determine 
the long-term interest rates that influence ag-
gregate demand. Financial stability is attained by 
microprudential regulation of bank capital that 
counteracts the moral hazard generated by deposit 
insurance, together with periodic supervisory as-
sessments and the necessary strictures meant to 
prevent excessive risk taking and malfeasance. Re-
gardless of whether the microprudential regulator 
is situated in the central bank or a separate special-
ized regulatory agency, financial regulation is seen 
as a separate activity.
Central bankers nowadays often observe that flex-
ible inflation targeting was never as straightfor-
ward as this framework suggests and that issues 
of financial stability and spillovers were always on 
their minds. Still, it remains accurate to say that 
the basic theoretical framework sketched above 
did much to shape their thinking. Its clarity and 
simplicity enabled it to gain adherents in academia 
and financial markets as well as in central banks.
Rethinking the Framework
Some of the practical achievements of the flexible 
inflation targeting framework are indisputable. 
The adoption of price stability objectives by coun-
tries at different levels of economic development 
was a major step forward after decades of domes-
tically-generated instability. This framework can 
be credited, at least in part, for the drop in global 
inflation and the abatement of exchange-rate con-
troversies among the advanced economies.3
Now, however, there is growing recognition that 
the conventional approach to central banking 
needs to be rethought. Critics reach this conclu-
sion for several related reasons:
•	 The conventional approach fails to ac-
count adequately for financial-sector risk 
and is therefore too narrowly focused.
•	 The conventional framework assumes lim-
ited or nonexistent cross-border spillovers 
2 Looking ahead, some even regarded this regime as the solution to perennial international monetary controversies (Rose, 2007).
3  To what extent IT can be credited for the disinflation of the 1990s and the early 2000s is a matter for discussion. Another important factor was 
the disinflationary pressure coming from the emerging countries’ exports. We return to the issue below.
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of monetary policies, while in fact spill-
overs are frequently of first-order impor-
tance. They can complicate monetary pol-
icy management, accentuate the volatility 
of real activity and increase financial-sec-
tor risk.
•	 The incompatibility of national monetary 
policies in the face of spillovers is height-
ened when countries follow different de 
facto monetary policy regimes (e.g., infla-
tion targeting and exchange rate target-
ing).4
•	 Spillovers may be further accentuated 
when central banks pursue unconven-
tional monetary interventions (e.g., when 
interest rates are at their floor and con-
strained by the zero bound). Because of 
weak domestic demand, as well as dis-
tressed banks that are unwilling to lend, 
the portfolio adjustments prompted by 
unconventional policies may largely serve 
to increase capital flows to countries with 
stronger growth prospects rather than 
boosting domestic credit as intended.
•	 High levels of government debt in ad-
vanced countries and the slowing growth 
of traditional export markets for develop-
ing countries create new sources of po-
litical pressure that central banks will find 
difficult to ignore. 
In this report, we start by considering the valid-
ity of these criticisms. We then go on to ask how 
central banking theory and practice need to be up-
dated in light of this shift in thinking. The report 
consists of four chapters (after this one) followed 
by our recommendations.
In Chapter 2, we describe how the global financial 
crisis has recast the debate over central banking. 
We focus on the relationship between the tradi-
tional emphasis on price stability and the broader 
goals of macroeconomic and financial stability. We 
discuss why the traditional separation, in which 
monetary policy targets price stability and regula-
tory policies target financial stability, and the two 
sets of policies operate largely independently of 
each other, is no longer tenable. 
If central banks do in fact embrace the goal of 
financial stability in addition to price stability, 
monetary policy-making and policy communica-
tion will become more challenging. We therefore 
consider the practical issues that arise when the 
central bank is forced to juggle multiple mandates.
We then turn in Chapter 3 to a criticism of the 
conventional policy framework: it assumes not 
just that central banks practice flexible inflation 
targeting but also that they allow the exchange rate 
to float freely. Under these assumptions, each cen-
tral bank has the independence necessary to target 
price stability and full employment.
The problem is that policy independence in theory 
may exceed policy independence in practice. In 
other words, the conventional framework fails to 
take into account that national policies can have 
powerful cross-border repercussions that the af-
fected partner may not be able to adequately off-
set with exchange rate movements. In part this 
is because the existing system is not, in fact, one 
of fully flexible exchange rates. In practice, some 
countries effectively target exchange rates (China’s 
tight management of its currency’s value relative 
to the US dollar being a prominent case in point). 
In part it is because international transmission oc-
curs even under flexible exchange rates, through 
both trade channels and capital flows. The conse-
quences include the prospective re-emergence of 
global imbalances as well as the proliferation of 
trade and capital controls when countries seek fur-
ther insulation from cross-border spillovers. 
4 Though the choice of regime itself may partly be a reaction to spillovers.
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To analyze these issues, in this chapter we provide 
a global perspective on the evolution of monetary 
policy and exchange rate regimes. We examine the 
problems that arise out of the incompatibility of 
national regimes with similar domestic objectives. 
We then discuss the challenges that arise in rec-
onciling domestic monetary policies with global 
macroeconomic stability. 
In Chapter 4, we describe how central banks are 
being pulled into new roles by the post-crisis en-
vironment and by the unavailability of alternative, 
potentially more suitable instruments.While some 
aspects of these roles are not new, they nonetheless 
move central banks into risky territory insofar as 
central bank actions can inflict collateral damage 
on domestic financial systems and have the po-
tential of raising new domestic and international 
tensions. We highlight two sets of issues: (a) the 
consequences of high levels of public and private 
debt in the advanced economies and the attendant 
pressures towards financial repression; and (b) 
the perceived dangers of currency misalignments 
and overvaluation, and the attendant pressures to-
wards currency intervention and capital controls. 
In Chapter 5, we draw on the analysis in previous 
chapters to recommend changes in the dominant 
framework guiding central banking practice. In 
the framework we propose, central banks should 
go beyond their traditional emphasis on low infla-
tion to adopt an explicit goal of financial stabil-
ity. Macroprudential tools should be used along-
side monetary policy in pursuit of that objective. 
Mechanisms should also be developed to encour-
age large-country central banks to internalize the 
spillover effects of their policies. Specifically, we 
call for the creation of an International Monetary 
Policy Committee composed of representatives of 
major central banks that will report regularly to 
world leaders on the aggregate consequences of 
individual central bank policies. 
While this report suggests more responsibilities for 
central banks, we also recognize the environment is 
one where there is substantial pressure on central 
banks to acknowledge the importance of still other 
issues, such as the high costs of public debt manage-
ment and the level of the exchange rate. While these 
pressures, if internalized, can make central bank ob-
jectives hopelessly diffuse, they are not reasons to 
postpone rethinking the overall policy framework. 
To the contrary, a framework that is seen as defi-
cient will become an easier political target.
For all these reasons, we believe it is time to re-
think the existing paradigm. The rest of the report 
lays out what this rethinking should entail. 
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CHAPTER 2
The Scope of Monetary Policy
I
n this chapter we describe how the global finan-
cial crisis has recast the debate over the scope of 
central banking functions. We focus on the re-
lationship between the traditional narrow goal of 
monetary policy—price stability—and the broader 
goals of macroeconomic and financial stability. We 
explain why the traditional separation, in which 
monetary policy targets price stability and regula-
tory policies target financial stability and the two 
sets of policies operate independently of each oth-
er, is no longer tenable. We then review some prac-
tical issues that arise in connection with attempts 
to coordinate the two sets of policies. 
Central Banks and Financial Stability
The global financial crisis shook confidence in mi-
croprudential tools of regulation as the primary in-
strument for ensuring financial stability. Yet many 
central bankers still subscribe to the traditional di-
chotomy between monetary policy and financial 
stability, except that microprudential tools have given 
way to an embrace of macroprudential tools of fi-
nancial regulation (countercyclical capital adequacy 
requirements, for example). These tools or policies, 
which mitigate risks to the financial system as a 
whole rather than solely at the level of the individual 
institution, are to be developed and implemented by 
specialists in financial stability, not by central bank-
ers responsible for the conduct of monetary policy.
The case for this separation rests on the belief that 
interest rates are too blunt an instrument for the 
effective pursuit of financial stability. The question 
is commonly framed as whether the central bank 
should raise interest rates in response to asset bub-
bles. In the 1990s and early 2000s, central bankers 
discussed at length whether and how to respond 
to asset market developments.5 The conclusion of 
that debate was that central banks had a mandate 
to react to bursting bubbles but not to target asset 
prices. Not everyone, however, shared this conclu-
sion. The ‘lean vs. clean’ debate remained active in 
the run-up to the crisis.6
5  The early debate was framed by the stock market boom of the late 1990s. Arguments in favor of “leaning against the wind” when it comes 
to financial developments have been given by Blanchard (2000), Bordo and Jeanne (2002), Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio and White (2003), 
Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000), Crockett (2003), Dudley (2006) and Goodhart (2000) among others. The argument against is 
given in Bean (2003), Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Bernanke (2002), Greenspan (2002), Kohn (2005), Mishkin (2008) and Stark (2008).
6  A policy school, primarily associated with economists from the Bank for International Settlements and the Bank of Japan, was critical of narrow 
inflation targeting and maintained that central banks could not forgo their responsibility for financial stability. Bank of Japan economists 
regretted having allowed the bubble to become too large in the second half of the 1980s. The European Central Bank never fully endorsed the 
standard formulation of inflation targeting and argued that the growth of monetary aggregates and credit developments were also important 
indicators of potential risks to price stability over a longer-term horizon.
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The case against attempting to prick bubbles rests 
on the following arguments.
•	 Identifying bubbles is hard.
•	 Even if there is a bubble, monetary policy 
is not the best tool with which to address 
it. An asset price bubble will not respond 
to small changes in interest rates; only a 
sharp increase will suffice to prick a bub-
ble. However, a drastic increase in interest 
rates can cause more harm than good by 
depressing output growth and increasing 
output volatility.
The claim that an asset price bubble will not re-
spond to a small change in interest rates has been 
made in the context of stock market bubbles, 
where the proposition is most plausible. When the 
stock market is rising by 20 percent a year, a small 
increase in interest rates will not outweigh the ef-
fects of rapid asset price increases.
However, the stock market may not be the best 
context in which to discuss the financial stability 
role of monetary policy. The housing market, with 
its more prominent role for leverage and credit, 
and markets in the derivative securities associated 
with housing investment may be more pertinent. 
Monetary policy stands at the heart of the lever-
age decisions of banks and other financial inter-
mediaries involved in lending for housing-related 
investments. In this setting, even small changes in 
funding costs may have an impact on risk-taking 
and funding conditions. Financial intermediaries, 
after all, borrow in order to lend. The spread be-
tween borrowing and lending rates is therefore a 
key determinant of the use of leverage and has im-
portant implications for the interaction between 
banking sector loan growth, risk premia, and any 
ongoing housing boom.7
Focusing on risk taking by banks and other finan-
cial intermediaries will lead the policy maker to ask 
additional questions about risks to the stability of 
economic activity. Rather than waiting for incontro-
vertible proof of a bubble in housing markets, for 
example, a policy maker could instead ask whether 
benign funding conditions could reverse abruptly 
with adverse consequences for the economy. Even 
if policy makers are convinced that higher housing 
prices are broadly justified by secular trends in pop-
ulation, household size, and living standards, policy 
intervention would still be justified if the policy 
maker also believed that, if left unchecked, current 
loose monetary conditions significantly raise the 
risk of an abrupt reversal in housing prices and of 
financing conditions, with adverse consequences 
for the financial system and the economy.
Not responding in this way has led to a dangerous-
ly asymmetric response to credit market develop-
ments. Central banks have allowed credit growth 
to run free, fueling booms, and then flooded mar-
kets with liquidity after the crash, bailing out fi-
nancial institutions and bondholders. This asym-
metry has contributed to stretched balance sheets, 
with faster lending growth and leverage in times of 
low risk premia, more violent deleveraging when 
risk premia rise, and frequent booms and busts. 
For all these reasons, there is a case for central 
banks to guard against credit market excesses. An 
inflation-targeting central bank may argue that it 
does so automatically insofar as higher asset prices 
boost aggregate demand through wealth effects 
and create inflationary pressures. However, some 
additional leaning against credit market develop-
ments would be advisable even in the absence of 
aggregate demand effects once it is determined 
that funding conditions and reduced risk premia 
indicate a nascent credit boom. Put differently, 
inflation-targeting central banks may want to stray 
below target when conditions are “boom-like”–
when rapid asset price growth is accompanied by 
substantial credit expansion—since policy would 
otherwise become asymmetric and execerbate 
macroeconomic volatility. 
7 See Adrian and Shin (2011) for a discussion of these linkages.
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Retiring the Separation Principle
A consequence of this doctrine of “leaning against 
the wind” is that the neat Tinbergen assignment of 
different tools to different objectives becomes more 
difficult to implement in practice. Interest rates affect 
financial stability and, hence, real activity. Equally, 
macroprudential tools impact credit growth and ex-
ternal imbalances with consequences for macroeco-
nomic and price stability. When consumer credit is 
growing rapidly and the household debt ratio is high, 
for example, restraining credit growth by changing 
guidance on loan-to-value (LTV) or debt service-to-
income (DTI) ratios over the business cycle will have 
important macro-stabilization effects.
Rather than viewing the allocation problem as hav-
ing a corner solution where one instrument is de-
voted entirely to one objective, the macro-stabiliza-
tion exercise must be viewed as a joint optimization 
problem where monetary and regulatory policies 
are used in concert in pursuit of both objectives. 
Believers in a strict interpretation of Tinbergen 
separation will fret that blurring the assignment of 
instruments to targets will jeopardize the central 
bank’s operational autonomy, the central bank’s 
mandate will become fuzzier, and its actions will 
become more difficult to justify.
These are valid concerns. Central bankers will ex-
perience more political pressure than if monetary 
policy were primarily targeted at price stability. 
Here, however, it is important to remember that 
central bank independence is a means to an end 
rather than an end in itself. Limiting the scope of 
monetary policy purely for the sake of defending 
central bank independence risks undermining the 
institution’s legitimacy by giving the impression 
that the central bank is out of touch and that it is 
pursuing a narrow and esoteric activity that does 
not square with its democratic responsibilities.
Ultimately, political reality will thrust responsibility 
for financial stability on the central bank. As hap-
pened in the UK following the failure of Northern 
Rock, the central bank will be blamed for financial 
problems whether or not it was formally responsi-
ble for supervision and regulation. As lender of last 
resort, it will be charged with cleaning up the mess. 
It follows that it would be better off devoting more 
of its resources and attention to attempting to pre-
vent the crisis, the elegance and analytical appeal of 
the Tinbergen principle notwithstanding.
Macroprudential Policy Tools
Macroprudential tools are designed to buttress the 
stability of the financial system as a whole, which 
is distinct from ensuring the stability of individ-
ual institutions. These tools are intended to help 
mitigate externalities and spillovers at the level of 
the system as a whole. For example, interlocking 
claims and obligations create externalities if the 
failure of one higly leveraged institution threatens 
the solvency of other institutions and the stability 
of the entire financial system. Fire sales of assets 
may magnify an initial shock and lead to vicious 
circles of falling assets prices and the need to de-
leverage and sell off assets. Externalities also arise 
over the course of the cycle if the structure of capi-
tal regulation allows an increase in leverage in fi-
nancial booms while dampening it in busts.
It is useful to distinguish between different mac-
roprudential tools that address these different as-
pects of financial risk. In particular, different tools 
should be used address the time- and cross-sec-
tional dimensions of risk. 
The Time Dimension in Macroprudential 
Supervision
In terms of the time dimension, the macropruden-
tial supervisor should develop a range of tools ca-
pable of tempering financial procyclicality. Coun-
tercyclical capital buffers, as recommended by the 
Basel Committee, are a case in point, although they 
are confined to the banking system. A supplement 
would be to impose a systemic levy for all levered 
financial institutions—that is, an additional charge 
levied on the unstable (non-core) portion of a 
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financial institution’s funding, as suggested by the 
IMF (2010). This levy could be varied over the the 
life of the cycle.
Restraints on bank lending such as loan-to-value 
(LTV) or debt service-to-income (DTI) guide-
lines could usefully complement traditional tools 
of bank regulation, such as capital requirements. 
Capital requirements can themselves consist of 
a core of long-dated equity or equity-like instru-
ments supplemented with an additional buffer of 
contingent capital instruments.
The interaction between these prudential mea-
sures, as well as their cumulative costs, need to be 
carefully considered while rolling them out, with 
a view to adjusting measures based on experience. 
And governments should guard against the temp-
tation to use such levies as just a revenue-gener-
ating mechanism rather than a tool to promote 
financial stability. 
Some measures (e.g., capital requirements) are 
likely to have implications for cross-border compe-
tition between financial institutions and therefore 
may need to be harmonized across countries. This 
will make it harder to tie them to local economic 
conditions, for such harmonization will have to be 
done in an objective and mutually agreeable way 
across countries. Others like LTV or DTI guid-
ance need not be harmonized across countries and 
could vary substantially with the domestic cycle. 
The systemic levy is a form of capital charge, mak-
ing harmonization important for countries with 
many cross-border banks, something that will ad-
mittedly make it more difficult to tie it to the cycle.
The Cross-sectional Dimension in 
Macroprudential Supervision
In terms of the cross-sectional dimension, policy 
should focus on systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs). Better resolution regimes to 
deal with failing financial institutions could re-
duce the need for reliance on ex ante buffers such 
as capital. Following the near collapse of Northern 
Rock, the United Kingdom was among the first 
to enact a resolution regime that provides super-
visors extensive authority to stabilize a failing in-
stitution.8 Germany enacted a similar law in Janu-
ary 2011 and the United States is in the process 
of empowering regulatory agencies to deal with 
future insolvencies of systemically relevant insti-
tutions. An important complication is that many 
systemically relevant institutions are active across 
geographical and product borders. These new laws 
have not been coordinated, and they are unlikely 
to be adequate for dealing with a large cross-bor-
der or cross-market failure. The new resolution 
regimes consequently do not solve the moral haz-
ard problem implicit in “too big to fail” (TBTF). It 
follows that the implicit public subsidy for TBTF 
institutions remains intact; hence the need for ex 
ante measures.
Macroprudential tools could be used to reduce 
this incentive to become too big to fail. They could 
include a systemic risk tax as suggested by the IMF 
(2010). Efforts to quantify systemic risk exposure 
for the purposes of regulation are now underway, 
but much else remains to be worked out, including 
who would impose this tax, on whom, and under 
what circumstances.
Alternatively, surcharges on capital requirements 
that vary with the systemic risk they create could 
be applied to SIFIs. The Swiss government com-
mission on TBTF institutions has shown how this 
could be done. In addition to increasing capital buf-
fers to nearly double the level of Basel III, the Swiss 
proposal makes the surcharge sensitive to systemic 
risk, calculated as a function of the balance sheet 
size and the market share of the institution.
Proposals have also been mooted to eliminate cer-
tain activities of SIFIs (e.g., proprietary trading), 
8  Japan enacted an emergency resolution mechanism in 1998, following the banking crisis of 1997. When the emergency term ended, the 
government set up a permanent resolution mechanism.  
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ringfence certain activities (such as retail banking, 
as discussed in the context of the Vickers Commis-
sion in the UK), or even break up SIFIs. There is 
no consensus among the authors of this report on 
what approach is most appropriate. But in devel-
oping all these proposals, care should be taken that 
they in fact reduce lower systemic risk and do not 
just shift risk to entities that are less visible to the 
regulatory authorities (including to entities less ca-
pable of managing that risk). Risk that is shunted 
out of sight in good times comes back to haunt the 
system in bad times.
Finally, supervisors need to identify direct and in-
direct exposures and linkages, cross border as well 
as national, in order to make supervision more 
effective. They need to identify institutions and 
trades where activity is disproportionately con-
centrated. While collecting the relevant data (on, 
for example, inter-bank derivative exposures) for 
their own supervisory needs, they should also dis-
seminate more aggregated information to market 
participants and the general public. Such dissemi-
nation will allow market participants to manage 
risks better and allow the public in turn to better 
monitor supervisory behavior. While individual 
countries now have efforts underway to collect and 
disseminate data (for example, the Office of Finan-
cial Supervision in the United States), we are still 
some distance from effective cross-border data 
collection and sharing. 
Institutional Responsibility
Who should be responsible for financial stability 
at the national level?9 There are two answers to this 
question. The coordinated approach gives multiple 
institutions (central bank, systemic risk boards, 
micro- and macroprudential supervisors) inter-
locking mandates, their own instruments, and a 
directive to cooperate. In contrast, the unified ap-
proach vests one institution, possibly the central 
bank, with multiple mandates and instruments. 
The coordinated approach dominated prior to the 
financial crisis and, despite its failures, has largely 
survived the reform process. In countries like In-
dia and the United States, administrative bodies 
have been set up to coordinate the efforts of mul-
tiple supervisory and regulatory bodies, although 
these bodies tend to lack enforcement power. In 
Europe, the push for greater regional coordination 
has been further complicated by the superimposi-
tion of an additional layer of supervisory institu-
tions with few powers of their own. Supervisory 
colleges, which collect relevant home- and host-
country supervisors of a large cross-border insti-
tution, are one of the tools for coordination among 
countries. But overall, the problem of incomplete 
coordination remains.
In particular, the problem that EU-wide banks are 
still largely supervised by national regulators is yet 
to be fully solved. A new body, the European Sys-
temic Risk Board (ESRB), has been charged with 
macroprudential supervision but is endowed with 
only weak powers and few effective instruments. 
The ESRB is large and unwieldy, comprising the 
central bank governors and financial supervisors 
of every EU country, plus a number of other func-
tionaries. Moreover, the ESRB can only issue rec-
ommendations and has no enforcement powers. 
While there is little consensus as to the best mod-
el, our contention that financial stability should 
be a core objective of the central bank increases 
the weight of arguments for giving central banks 
primary responsibility for regulatory matters. If 
central banks have a mandate to ensure finan-
cial stability and also the powers needed to wield 
macroprudential corrective instruments, they can 
optimally choose trade-offs between the use of 
the interest rate instrument and macroprudential 
measures. Moreover, the central bank will have, 
or should have, its finger on the pulse of financial 
markets through its monetary policy operations. It 
possesses a staff with macroeconomic expertise. It 
9 Alternatively, at the regional level in places where multiple national economies share a single central bank (e.g., Euroland).
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is the one institution with the balance sheet capac-
ity to act as lender of last resort.
There are also compelling arguments against a uni-
fied model. One disadvantage is that it makes the 
central bank more susceptible to political interfer-
ence. The central bank will have to work hard to 
establish the legitimacy of its actions in circum-
stances where the nature of threats to financial sta-
bility may be poorly understood and its actions are 
unpopular. The public and its elected representa-
tives may not be happy, for example, if the central 
bank curbs credit growth and causes asset prices 
to fall, and they will pressure the authorities to re-
verse course.
The unified model may also pose a conflict of in-
terest for the central bank, which may, for example, 
be tempted to keep interest rates aritificially low in 
an effort to aid distressed financial institutions, or 
to treat a bank facing a solvency problem (a mat-
ter properly addressed by the fiscal authority or its 
agents) as if it were facing a liquidity problem. 
If, on balance, the decision is to make the central 
bank the macroprudential supervisor, this ap-
proach should go hand in hand with measures to 
strengthen its independence from political pres-
sure. To this end, it is important for the central 
bank to participate in the public discussion of how 
its performance will be evaluated. More regular 
communication of the rationale for its policies will 
also become increasingly important.
In sum, there are advantages to both models, and 
individual countries’ institutional characteristics 
and political settings will determine what works 
best. Whatever the mechanism, it is clear that ef-
fective coordination between monetary and finan-
cial regulatory policies will be the lynchpin of fi-
nancial stability.
Exchange Rates and Monetary 
Policy
The external dimension of monetary policy is criti-
cally important for small open economies with open 
capital accounts. Capital flows and exchange rate 
movements are important for price-level develop-
ments. They are important for financial stability as 
well:  in open economies, monetary policy may have 
limited effectiveness in influencing credit develop-
ments because, inter alia, financial intermediaries 
can substitute external funding for domestic funding.
Macroprudential tools that lean against credit de-
velopments can give the central bank some mea-
sure of monetary policy autonomy, weakening the 
link between domestic monetary policy and capi-
tal inflows. For instance, by leaning against credit 
expansion, the central bank may be able to reduce 
the incentive for banks to borrow externally when 
domestic interest rates are increased. 
The tensions between these different facets of eco-
nomic stabilization become more acute when the 
currency is strong relative to fundamentals and the 
government wants to prevent excessive apprecia-
tion. This puts the central bank in a corner when 
domestic demand is also too strong. There is then 
the need to cool an overheating economy by allow-
ing the appreciation of the currency, on the one 
hand, but pressure to guard against the erosion of 
competitiveness from what might prove to be only 
a temporary appreciation, on the other. Capital 
controls that moderate financial inflows, especially 
short-term inflows that are channeled through the 
domestic banking sector, may alleviate the policy 
dilemma but their role as a legitimate part of the 
policy maker’s toolbox remains controversial.
Much commentary takes for granted that “capi-
tal controls don’t work.”10 Commentators making 
10  See, for instance, the following editorial in the Wall Street Journal: Capital-Control Comeback: As Money Flows to Asia, Politicians Play King 
Canute, 2010, June 17. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704289504575312080651478488.html 
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such claims typically assume that the objective is 
either to hold down the exchange rate or to sup-
press the total volume of inflows. In this approach 
the emphasis is on the exchange rate’s influence on 
the trade balance and thus also the attempt to hold 
back currency appreciation by limiting financial 
inflows, whatever their precise form.
But if capital controls and related macropruden-
tial measures are seen not as instruments of ex-
change rate management but as part of a package 
of policies targeted at financial stability, then it is 
the composition of capital flows that takes center 
stage rather than their volume.11 Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and portfolio equity flows are 
less likely to reverse direction abruptly. And even 
when portfolio flows do reverse, the impact on 
funding may be less damaging than any sudden 
loss of access by the banking sector. Foreign sell-
ers of stocks in a crisis face the double penalty of 
lower local currency prices when they sell and a 
sharply depreciating exchange rate, the implica-
tion being that the dollar-equivalent outflow as-
sociated with repatriation of portfolio equity sales 
proceeds tends to be small compared to the pre-
crisis marked-to-market value of foreign holdings 
of equity. And the typical equity investor (such as 
a pension fund or mutual fund) is not leveraged.
In contrast, when foreign funding of the banking 
sector evaporates abruptly, the consequences are 
more damaging. If the local bank is leveraged and 
debt is denominated in dollars, then outflows can 
set off the well-known cycle of distress in which 
belated attempts by banks to hedge their dollar ex-
posure drives down the value of the local currency, 
making the dollar-denominated debt even larger.12 
If the crisis erupts after a long build-up of such 
mismatches, the coincidence of the banking crisis 
with the currency crisis (the “twin crisis”) can un-
dermine banking sector solvency, with significant 
economic costs.
Capital controls are not, of course, the only tool for 
dealing with inflows. Microprudential tools such 
as minimum capital ratios should be part of the 
policy response. Even these tools, however, may 
not be enough to dampen the upswing of the cycle. 
Bank capital ratios often look strong during booms 
when banks are profitable and the measured qual-
ity of loans is high. In addition, the application 
of discretionary measures, such as higher capital 
requirements, must surmount concerted lobbying 
by vested interests that benefit from the boom. 
Currency appreciation may also help to moder-
ate the size of capital inflows, as foreign investors 
perceive less of a one way bet. However, when 
banking sector flows form the bulk of the inflows, 
merely allowing the currency to appreciate may 
not suffice. The behavior of banks and other lever-
aged institutions is additionally influenced by their 
capital position and their perception of risks. Cur-
rency appreciation and strong profitability coupled 
with tranquil economic conditions can be seen by 
banks as a cue to expand lending rather than to 
curtail their activity.
In sum, capital controls can, under some circum-
stances, be useful for managing maturity and 
currency mismatches and, in particular, for fore-
stalling dollar shortages in the banking system. 
Judiciously employed along with other macropru-
dential policies, they can reduce financial instabil-
ity as well as boom-bust cycles, thereby serving as 
a useful complement to conventional monetary 
policy instruments. As with other instruments, 
care should be taken that they are used to reduce 
macro-economic volatility rather than merely 
to suppress it, only to see it emerge in other, po-
tentially more destructive ways. Moreover, with 
capital accounts becoming more open and given 
the increasing fungibility of funds across different 
forms of capital, even controls limited to specific 
types of capital flows are becoming an increasingly 
11 For an extensive discussion, see Ostry, Ghosh, Habermeier, Chamon, Qureshi, and Reinhardt (2010).
12 Figuratively, the attempt to clamber out of the ditch by buying dollars merely drags others into the ditch.
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weak substitute for good macroeconomic and pru-
dential policies.
Conclusion
This chapter has made the case for augmenting the 
traditional narrow price stability focus of mon-
etary policy with the additional goal of financial 
stability. The conventional separation in which 
monetary policy targets price stability and micro-
prudential policies target financial stability, and 
the two sets of policies operate independently of 
each other, is no longer tenable.
This has a number of implications. 
•	 Policy makers need a new set of policies 
that are macroprudential in nature, target-
ing the build up of risks to financial stabil-
ity. These policies range from countercy-
clical capital ratios to capital controls. 
•	 The neat Tinbergen separation of two 
tools for two objectives is no longer fea-
sible. Interest rates affect financial stability 
and, hence, real activity. Equally, macro-
prudential tools impact credit growth and 
external imbalances, which have conse-
quences for macroeconomic and price 
stability. Central bankers therefore will 
have to consider tradeoffs as they optimize 
among their policy tools to achieve their 
multiple objectives.
We believe that explicit recognition of such trade-
offs will, in some cases, move theory closer to prac-
tice. In other cases it will make adopting inflation 
targeting more attractive insofar as the framework 
now recognizes issues that some policy makers 
hitherto thought were missing. And in the case of 
the few who still adhere to narrow inflation target-
ing, it might prompt a welcome reconsideration.
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CHAPTER 3
Cross-Border Spillovers
I
n the last chapter we discussed how national 
monetary policy frameworks should be re-
thought to better incorporate financial-stability 
considerations. But there is another equally im-
portant reason for rethinking the framework: in-
ternational spillovers.
If national policies have important cross-border 
effects, then there is a prima facie case for coordi-
nating them internationally. This observation was 
of course the main point of the voluminous 1980s 
literature on spillovers and policy coordination. 
But it has since been rendered more compelling by 
changes in the world economy in the last quarter 
century. The world today is more connected than 
ever by cross-border financial flows. The policy 
choices of individual countries, especially those of 
large, systemically significant countries, can have a 
substantial impact on their neighbors. When gov-
ernments and central banks change their macro-
economic policy stance dramatically—as they did 
in the recent world financial crisis—the spillovers 
on other nations can be sizeable. 
Cross-border spillovers may also have increased as a 
result of the nature of policy responses to economic 
shocks and business cycle conditions. A commonly 
voiced concern is that unconventional monetary 
policies may have especially large and complex 
cross-border spillovers. For instance, monetary in-
jections when the nominal interest rate is at its zero 
bound might result in capital outflows rather than 
in more domestic activity, if domestic demand is 
weak and banks are reluctant to lend.13
And while concern in the 1980s centered on the 
interaction of the United States and Europe, two 
economic blocs with floating exchange rates, spill-
overs today involve one bloc that floats—the major 
advanced countries—and one, led by China, with 
fixed or semi-fixed exchange rates. This asymme-
try gives rise to important new issues. 
In this chapter we review various channels for in-
ternational transmission of domestic policies and 
discuss their implications. We then discuss the 
tensions that arise in reconciling domestic mon-
etary policies with the larger objective of global 
macroeconomic and financial stability. 
Cracks in the Framework of 
(Mostly) Flexible Exchange Rates 
The international properties of the de facto regime 
of flexible exchange rates were never as desirable 
as asserted by its champions. To start with, the new 
regime was not, in fact, universally adopted. It was 
13 This combination of circumstances is not unusual—witness what happened during the recent financial crisis.
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not widely adopted in Asia, for example, where de 
jure or de facto pegging remained the reality and a 
large volume of foreign exchange reserves was ac-
cumulated in the 2000s, contrary to the presump-
tion that reserves would become superfluous with 
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of 
fixed exchange rates. 
Moreover, large current-account surpluses and 
deficits (‘imbalances’) persisted over much of the 
last decade without prompting macroeconomic 
and exchange-rate responses. Imbalances persist-
ed in countries with very different exchange rate 
arrangements, including countries that did not 
maintain dollar pegs, such as Japan and Germany. 
Questions also remained about the ability of infla-
tion targeting cum floating exchange rates to cope 
with the volatility of international capital flows. 
While stability-oriented monetary policies at the 
national level could help to limit the magnitude 
of sudden inflows and reversals, and while strong 
regulatory and supervisory frameworks could help 
limit their consequences, it was unclear whether 
such measures would be sufficient to protect 
emerging economies from macroeconomic and 
financial instability.
Nor did the IT-floating framework eliminate the 
special role of the dollar as the key international 
currency. The dollar remains the world’s most im-
portant reserve currency and a leading invoicing 
currency for international trade. It is also the cur-
rency that underpins the global banking system as 
the funding currency for global banks. This raises 
important questions about access to dollar liquid-
ity by non-US banking systems in times of stress.14
Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom
In light of the financial crisis and subsequent de-
velopments, several reasons have emerged for re-
visiting the conventional wisdom:
•	 Convergence towards the inflation target-
ing cum flexible exchange-rate framework 
remains incomplete. While a large part of 
the world economy has adopted this mod-
el, some fast-growing emerging markets 
have not. The coexistence of floaters and 
fixers therefore remains a characteristic 
of the world economy. It can even be said 
that the incidence of pegging has risen 
over time with the export drive of East 
Asia and, toward the end of the most re-
cent decade, the rise of the relative price 
of oil.
•	 The period in which the IT regime was test-
ed was exceptionally benign. China’s en-
try into global trade and other emerging 
markets acted as a strong disinflationary 
force, making for price stability globally. 
Commodity prices remained subdued un-
til the late 2000s, and there were few in-
flation spillovers. Since then the situation 
has changed. In a new context where com-
modity prices respond strongly to aggre-
gate demand, a major question is whether 
central banks take into account spillovers 
through global commodity prices when 
making monetary policy decisions. 
•	 Capital market spillovers between ad-
vanced and emerging economies have 
grown. While Obstfeld’s (2009) character-
ization of the world economy as compris-
ing a single financial system may not apply 
to all countries, it is certainly correct for 
North America, Europe, East Asia, and 
a number of emerging market countries. 
Private gross capital flows to and from 
both the US and Europe grew massively in 
the course of recent decades. To be sure, 
this was in large part for reasons indepen-
dent of monetary policy, including finan-
cial liberalization, the unique role of the 
14 For an extensive discussion of these issues see Farhi, Gourinchas, and Rey (2011).
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US as supplier of safe financial assets, and 
the attractiveness of emerging markets 
as destinations for investment. Still, the 
resulting financial interpenetration im-
plies that the stock of diversifiable assets 
and cross-border holdings that respond 
to changes in monetary conditions have 
grown enormously.15 This creates chal-
lenges for countries on the receiving end 
of capital flows. In practice, many of those 
recipients are emerging market economies 
that are struggling to prevent the surges in 
capital inflows from leading to exchange 
rate misalignment and unsustainable 
lending booms.
•	 Unconventional monetary policies are likely 
to accentuate international spillovers. Such 
policies are typically undertaken when 
traditional instruments are exhausted and 
traditional channels have ceased working. 
In such situations, unconventional poli-
cies could result in less domestic demand 
creation and more demand shifts between 
countries. Critics argue that purchases by 
central banks of long-dated bonds and pri-
vate-sector-issued securities create liquid-
ity that can spill abroad (because domestic 
channels for credit creation are blocked), 
causing capital flows to and undesirable 
relative price changes in other countries.16 
Central banks in countries conducting 
quantitative easing—the US Federal Re-
serve and the Bank of England—argue 
that Quantitative Easing (QE) is no differ-
ent conceptually from conventional mon-
etary policy but merely its continuation 
through other means in a situation where 
interest rates approach the zero bound. 
Central banks in several emerging market 
countries, in contrast, claim that QE is a 
beggar-thy-neighbor strategy.
These observations suggest that convergence to-
wards a common policy template in the 2000s was 
not general. Moreover, where convergence has 
take place, it may not last long in view of the chal-
lenges currently confronting monetary policy. It is 
therefore important to assess whether a reformed 
consensus can and will be formed and to contem-
plate its implications for the conduct of monetary 
policy and for the ‘own house in order’ doctrine in 
particular. 
Challenges to the IT-plus-floating Regime
1. Uneasy coexistence: floaters and fixers 
The idealized IT-plus-floating framework has not 
worked out as anticipated, because countries have 
not converged to similar monetary and exchange 
rate arrangements. 
In Latin America, a substantial number of coun-
tries, some of them large and economically im-
portant, resist moving in this direction. While the 
two largest countries –Brazil and Mexico—and an 
important set of middle-sized and small nations 
–Colombia, Peru, Chile, Uruguay—have adopted 
it, another sizeable group including Venezuela, Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador continues to pursue 
fixed or semi-fixed exchange regimes, sometimes 
with multiple exchange rates for different current 
and capital account transactions. Few countries 
in the Middle East and Africa have converted to 
IT plus floating, though economically important 
South Africa has adopted it. 
In Asia, several countries have adopted the frame-
work, albeit with different degrees of commit-
ment. Inflation targets are explicit in Thailand, 
Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In Thailand 
and Korea, low and stable inflation was achieved 
in the 2000s. Singapore has achieved low and sta-
ble inflation using a basket-based exchange rate 
15  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) and Kubelec and Sá (2010) provide a quantitative account of financial integration and the participation in it of 
major emerging economies. 
16 See Portes (2010) for a discussion.
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regime, since the economy is small and highly open 
to financial flows. Usually, however, Asian central 
banks have multiple objectives: growth, price sta-
bility, and exchange rate stability, some of which 
temper the conventional framework. It is fair to 
say that many East Asian countries deal with in-
flation more on the basis of discretion than pre-
set rules. In Cambodia and Vietnam, dollarization 
and the lack of independence of the central bank 
is a serious problem in stabilizing inflation. India 
has a hybrid regime without an explicit inflation 
objective and with exchange rate management in 
principle limited to moderating sharp movements 
in the currency’s value.
China is the largest nation with a managed ex-
change rate. The renminbi was delinked from its 
US dollar peg in 2005 but remains tightly managed 
against the dollar. Among the explanations for this 
choice of exchange rate regime are the government’s 
objective of promoting export-led growth. Another 
is the desire to self-insure against external shocks 
by accumulating a large stock of reserves. China’s 
foreign exchange reserves now exceed $3 trillion, 
dwarfing by a wide margin all evaluations of the 
reserve buffer necessary to insure against sudden 
stops of inflows or a surge of capital outflows.
National and regional differences aside, a common 
feature of policies in these countries is a reluctance 
to allow exchange rates to move as much as needed 
to accommodate external disturbances, especially 
those originating in the capital account. Non-float-
ers monitor nominal and sometimes also real ex-
change rates and use not just foreign exchange mar-
ket intervention but a whole array of instruments to 
prevent unwanted exchange rate movements. 
In sum, notwithstanding the perceived success of 
inflation targeting with flexible exchange rates, 
countries operating a freely floating exchange-
rate regime, whether measured in terms of global 
GDP or global exports, have not increased over 
the last two decades. To the contrary, the share 
of such countries, so measured, has actually de-
clined (Figure 1).
The main consequence is that the adjustment 
mechanism implied by the standard IT-plus-float-
ing arrangement has not been allowed to operate. 
This is one explanation for the size and persistence 
of global imbalances. According to the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook, these imbalances reached 3% 
of world GDP in 2007, before the advent of the 
crisis.17 The subsequent crash then reduced cur-
rent account deficits in countries such as the US 
and the UK as their demand for imports dropped 
sharply. But according to the April 2011 WEO, im-
balances once again began to grow starting in 2010 
and will hover around 2% of world GDP between 
now and 2016.
A prominent instance of the uneasy coexistence 
of floaters and fixers is the tug of war between 
US monetary policy and exchange rate policy in 
emerging market “fixers” such as China. A highly 
stimulative US monetary policy is potentially fu-
eling inflation elsewhere, including in emerging 
markets that have closed their output gaps and are 
facing inflationary pressures. Of course, emerg-
ing market central banks could raise interest rates 
more rapidly, but they would then attract capital 
inflows and experience faster exchange rate appre-
ciation. Meanwhile, emerging market resistance 
to exchange rate appreciation is limiting export 
and employment growth in industrial countries 
already experiencing high and persistent unem-
ployment. In normal circumstances, the United 
States and other advanced economies would ad-
just by cutting interest rates. But these countries 
are already at the zero bound. In this context, the 
exchange rate policy of emerging market “fixers” is 
imposing a negative demand externality on the ad-
vanced economies. In tandem with the inflation-
ary externality imposed by US monetary policy, 
this has created severe policy complications for 
17  That is the size of the current account surpluses in countries like China, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, and the oil producers, matched (up to 
errors and omissions) by the corresponding deficits in the US, the UK, Spain and elsewhere. 
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FIGURE 1:  Shares of countries under alternative exchange-rate regimes in world GDP and 
world exports, 1980-2007
World GDP
World Exports
Source: Angeloni et al. (2011). Calculations are based on the Ilzeztki-Reinhart-Rogoff classification. Euro area countries are 
treated separately throughout in order not to introduce a break in the series.
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other countries, especially emerging markets that 
are floaters.
Collective action problems arise from these asym-
metric exchange rate arrangements. Many emerg-
ing market countries in East Asia, even those that 
ostensibly float, explicitly or implicitly monitor 
their real exchange rates. They are reluctant to see 
their currencies appreciate excessively, especially 
relative to other countries in the region. This reluc-
tance hinders nominal exchange-rate adjustment 
between East Asia and the advanced economies at 
a time when asymmetries between the two groups 
urgently call for real exchange-rate adjustment.
Concerns about exchange rate appreciation and 
overshooting are not limited to the emerging mar-
kets, of course. The recent intervention in foreign 
exchange markets by committed floaters such 
as Japan and Switzerland highlights the tensions 
building up in the global economy as public debt 
levels in the major reserve currency areas—the 
US and Europe—impose more of a burden on the 
Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank to 
maintain lax monetary policy with attendant spill-
overs to the rest of the world (as discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter). 
Fixing also creates policy dilemmas for countries 
seeking to fix. These countries are by choice de-
pendent on their partners’ monetary policy de-
cisions, especially but not only when they have 
opened the financial account. Attempting not to 
import foreign monetary conditions while fixing 
has required extraordinary measures.
Take China, whose capital account is only partial-
ly open. Experiencing large balance of payments 
surpluses, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) 
has regularly intervened in the foreign exchange 
market to limit the appreciation of the renminbi. 
The resulting increase in China’s foreign exchange 
reserves accounts for almost all the increase in 
China’s monetary base. To sterilize the increase 
in the money supply created by its intervention in 
the foreign exchange market, the PBOC has been 
forced to sell all of its holdings of government se-
curities and to sell central bank bills to state-owned 
commercial banks. This strategy has been abetted 
by repressed interest rates, creating distortions in 
financial markets and in effect taxing households 
who receive negative real returns on their massive 
stock of bank deposits. 
The financial crisis heightened these tensions. Its 
size and depth increased the incentive for emerg-
ing markets experiencing sharp capital flow rever-
sals to self-insure by accumulating even larger re-
serves.18 Moreover, the instability of world demand 
has caused a number of countries, not all of them 
in Asia, to place an even greater premium on man-
aging the level of the real exchange rate. This has 
led them to deploy a broad array of tools, includ-
ing capital controls, to prevent unwanted apprecia-
tion (for a more detailed discussion of this issue, 
see Chapter 4 below). 
There are two possible assessments of these trends. 
One minimizes the importance of the asymme-
try of exchange rate policies on the grounds that 
what matters for international adjustment is real 
exchange rates, which governments cannot control 
in the long run. Thus, recent price and wage infla-
tion in China is causing non-trivial appreciation of 
the renminbi in real terms vis-à-vis the dollar even 
while the nominal bilateral exchange rate remains 
relatively stable. 
The alternative view, which we share, is that inter-
national adjustment via wage and price inflation 
is slow and inefficient. The world economy would 
be better served by a speedier mechanism involv-
ing greater exchange rate flexibility. If flexibility 
is not feasible for domestic political reasons, then 
incentives need to be put in place to make sure 
large nations among both groups—fixers but also 
floaters—internalize the international effects of 
their actions. 
18 That factor alone suggests that fixed or semi-fixed exchange rate arrangements will be around for some time in emerging markets.
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2.  Controlling inflation in a less benign 
environment
For the second time in three years, rising commodi-
ty prices are fuelling global inflation. This inflation-
ary pressure is superimposed on the background of 
still-large output gaps and high unemployment in 
virtually all advanced countries. This combination 
is problematic for an inflation-targeting strategy in 
which central banks focus on the components of 
inflation that are under their direct control. Indeed, 
for central banks in commodity-importing coun-
tries, a rise in oil or commodity prices is an exog-
enous supply shock, and the standard model says 
that the central bank should only respond to the 
extent that the shock has second-round effects and 
increases expected future inflation.
Targeting domestically-generated inflation was an 
appropriate strategy and did not raise concerns 
about collective action problems in the 1990s and 
the early 2000s, when an ample supply of com-
modities and the entry of China and other devel-
oping countries into the global labor force helped 
subdue global inflation. Against the background of 
a steep global commodity supply curve, however, 
expansionary monetary policies by major econo-
mies—advanced and emerging alike—may create 
negative externalities that are not adequately inter-
nalized in the standard framework.
This shortcoming is especially evident in the strict 
inflation-targeting framework in which the central 
bank commits to keeping the forecast rate of infla-
tion (conditional on market expectations for the 
policy rate) on target. In this setting, the global en-
vironment is taken as given and is not affected by 
domestic monetary policy responses. As a conse-
quence, the global monetary policy stance is likely 
to be suboptimal.
In small open economies, monetary policy is rea-
sonably geared to domestic objectives. The same, 
however, does not apply to the large-economy 
central banks, such as the Fed, the ECB, and the 
PBOC. These economies are large enough for their 
policy choices to involve significant externalities. 
It would therefore be desirable that these central 
banks, and perhaps a handful of others, include 
in their policy objective a measure of these ef-
fects. Clearly, however, such a move would involve 
a collective-action dimension, which calls for an 
explicit dialogue among these central banks about 
the amendment of their policy frameworks. We re-
turn to this later.
3. Financial channels of transmission
In the idealized world in which all central banks 
pursue IT and allow their exchange rates to float, 
an individual central bank’s monetary policy ac-
tions—say, a cut in the interest rate—are transmit-
ted to the rest of the world mainly through two 
channels: 
•	 The cut in local interest rates stimulates 
domestic demand, some of which spills 
over to additional imports. The magni-
tude of this effect on the rest of the world 
depends on the country’s share of world 
GDP. 
•	 The country’s nominal and real exchange 
rates depreciate, shifting demand away 
from the rest of the world. Again, the size 
of this cross-border effect depends on the 
size of the country in question. 
In this stylized model, capital flows only have an 
indirect role, with the potential for outflows from 
the country undertaking an expansionary mon-
etary policy causing movements in the value of its 
currency. Prices bear the burden of adjustment. 
In contrast, recent experience points to the exis-
tence of additional channels whose role and im-
pact may well be large and potentially destabiliz-
ing. While the fact that the impact of capital move-
ments can dwarf that of the more traditional trade 
effects has long been understood, the new and 
novel observation concerns the size of the cross-
border capital movements triggered by the supply 
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of liquidity or small changes in interest rates in ad-
vanced countries. This reflects the accumulation of 
a huge pool of footloose assets responsive to small 
changes in expected returns.
The composition of these investment portfolios is 
interest-rate sensitive and likely to respond sharp-
ly to differences in expected rates of economic 
growth in recipient countries. An example is the 
massive capital flows to emerging markets in 2010 
in response to the growth slowdown and record-
low interest rates in major advanced countries. 
Policy spillovers to the rest of the world can be 
sizeable in the case of the United States, which 
hosts branches of some 160 foreign banks whose 
main function is to raise wholesale dollar funding 
in capital markets. Foreign bank branches collec-
tively raise over one trillion dollars of funding, of 
which over 600 billion dollars is channeled to their 
headquarters outside the United States.19
Although the United States is the single largest net 
debtor, it is a substantial net creditor in the glob-
al banking system. In effect, the US borrows long 
through the issue of treasury and other securities 
while lending short through the banking sector. 
This is in contrast to countries like Ireland and Spain 
that financed their current account deficits through 
their respective banking sectors, which subsequent-
ly faced runs by their wholesale creditors.
Some borrowed dollars will find their way back to 
the United States. But many will flow to Europe, 
Asia, and Latin America, where global banks are 
active local lenders. At the margin, the shadow val-
ue of bank funding will be equalized across regions 
through the portfolio decisions of global banks, 
making global banks the carriers of dollar liquidity 
across borders. In this way, permissive US liquidity 
conditions are transmitted globally, and US mon-
etary policy becomes global monetary policy.20
An additional channel of transmission is through 
commodity prices. Low interest rates in the G-3 
countries have a tendency to push up primary-
commodity prices, both because the associated 
low borrowing costs mean high consumption and 
investment demand for these products, including 
from emerging markets, and because a low inter-
est rate reduces the financial cost of holding stocks 
of storable commodities, thus making them more 
attractive as investment vehicles. 
From the point of view of a commodity-producing 
country, lower world interest rates thus improve 
the terms of trade and increase local wealth and 
creditworthiness. A rating upgrade may follow. All 
this makes the country even more attractive for 
footloose international capital, creating pressures 
for currency appreciation. 
These cross-border effects can be magnified by 
differences in exchange rate regimes. In recipi-
ent countries with freely floating exchange rates, 
standard theory suggests that the local currency 
should appreciate in response to a cut in foreign 
interest rates. It could even appreciate beyond its 
new steady-state level on impact, before then de-
preciating until reaching its new equilibrium level. 
But if the country in question has a managed float 
or semi-fixed exchange rate, the required apprecia-
tion will not occur on impact. Even so, expecta-
tions of appreciation will eventually set in, making 
it more attractive to shift capital toward the coun-
try. This may bring forth additional inflows, in 
turn creating additional pressure for the exchange 
rate to strengthen. 
The situation is even more complicated if interven-
tion in the foreign exchange market is sterilized. The 
need to issue local bonds to mop up the liquidity re-
sulting from the purchase of foreign exchange may 
cause local interest rates to rise, attracting even more 
19 Bank for International Settlements (2010).  
20 See also Cetorelli and Goldberg (Forthcoming).
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inward capital flows. And since local interest rates 
are likely to be higher to begin with (if the recipient 
country is an emerging market), this sterilization 
will be expensive. If sustained over a sufficiently 
long period, sterilized intervention can weaken fis-
cal accounts, causing expectations of monetization 
and higher inflation, which in turn will cause local 
nominal rates to go up. This, in turn, can call forth 
yet another round of destabilizing capital inflows. 
The conventional view of international spillovers 
has also relied on the assumption of smoothly-
adjusting international capital markets, something 
that seems less than tenable today. The 2007-09 
financial crisis serves as a reminder that financial 
flows can reverse abruptly, placing intense pressure 
on the functioning and integrity of markets and 
market participants. This has been pointed out re-
peatedly after recent capital-account currency cri-
ses—Mexico, Asia, Russia, Brazil, and Argentina. 
What is new in the 2007-09 crisis was that it hap-
pened even in some advanced countries—for ex-
ample, some European economies, such as Ireland. 
A nation previously flooded with capital can thus 
become the subject of a sharp reversal in flows. 
Margin and borrowing constraints can suddenly 
become binding, leading to a painful process of 
deleveraging. If the need to raise cash causes one 
round of asset sales, the prices of those assets will 
fall, reducing the value of collateral and calling forth 
further asset sales and additional price drops. This 
can cause massive destruction of value, as firms find 
themselves liquidity-constrained and abandon un-
finished potentially profitable investment projects. 
Policy makers in countries on the receiving end of 
these flows face an unappetizing choice. If they al-
low the currency to appreciate, they expose them-
selves to accusations of overvaluation, loss of com-
petitiveness, and de-industrialization. But if they 
fight the appreciation via intervention, they may 
find themselves on the receiving end of ever-larger 
inflows. The central bank may end up allowing 
some appreciation anyway, but not before accu-
mulating a large stock of expensive domestic li-
abilities and a large stock of international reserves 
on which it will take a capital loss (in domestic 
currency terms) if and when the exchange rate ad-
justment eventually happens. 
While the conventional model of IT-plus-floating 
acknowledged these complications, it did not place 
them at the center of the analysis. To the extent 
countries targeted core inflation, spillovers through 
global commodity prices were left unattended. This 
was not a serious concern in the1980s and 1990s, 
the period of the Great Moderation, but is a more 
serious one in the presence of large global imbal-
ances and the need to accommodate large stocks 
of internationally mobile capital “looking for yield.” 
4. Normal versus crisis times
The conventional wisdom was developed in tran-
quil times. In crises, in contrast, central banks have 
resorted to an array of non-conventional mon-
etary policies such as quantitative easing (QE)—
the printing of money to buy bonds. What do such 
policies imply for the question of international 
spillovers of monetary policy? 
One view is that unconventional policies are no 
different from conventional policies in their cross-
border implications. If floating exchange rates can 
adjust to make international coordination of con-
ventional policies unnecessary, then the same must 
be true of unconventional policies. This was the 
view of the United States following the adoption 
of QE2. In response to complaints from emerging 
market policy makers who feared the wave of li-
quidity coming their way, Fed officials essentially 
argued that, “everything will be okay if you just let 
your currencies appreciate.”21
21  As indicated, for example, by the following excerpt from the speech by Fed chairman Ben Bernanke on November 19, 2010 at the ECB Central 
Banking Conference: “An important driver of the rapid capital inflows to some emerging markets is incomplete adjustment of exchange rates in 
those economies, which leads investors to anticipate additional returns arising from expected exchange rate appreciation.”
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The alternative view is that beggar-thy-neighbor 
impacts are greater when using unconventional 
instruments. The difficulty arises in evaluating 
whether the use of such instruments is consistent 
with the normal policy framework or represents 
an attempt mainly to weaken the currency and 
boost exports in the absence of a positive domes-
tic demand response. The same causes that jus-
tify recourse to unconventional policies make the 
inflation-targeting compass lose precision. When 
inflation significantly undershoots its target and 
central banks resort to instruments with which 
they have little experience, it is much harder to 
say whether a policy stance is in line with the IT 
framework or whether it represents an attempt at 
competitive devaluation.
In addition, spillovers may work differently in times 
of crisis. During a crisis, local credit demand is likely 
to be weak and banks’ willingness to lend domesti-
cally will be especially limited. For every additional 
dollar of liquidity that is created by monetary policy, 
a larger share will end up abroad in crisis times than 
in normal times, thereby depreciating the exchange 
rate at the expense of trade partners. It follows that 
spillovers are potentially larger during episodes of 
local financial distress.
The presence of international spillovers suggests 
that coordination can lead to better global out-
comes. In addition, the current situation high-
lights the need for principles and procedures for 
deciding when an unconventional monetary pol-
icy is beggar-thy-neighbor in its effect. In turn, 
these principles should form the basis for correc-
tive action.
Conclusion
The cross-border spillovers from monetary policy 
provide yet another reason for rethinking not just 
the domestic monetary policy framework but also 
mechanisms for ensuring compatibility between 
large-country policies. We will turn to recommen-
dations that follow from this analysis in Chapter 
Five. But before offering recommendations, we 
turn to a discussion of some additional policy bur-
dens on central banks in the aftermath of the crisis.
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CHAPTER 4
Additional Pressures on Central Banks
I
n this chapter we describe how central banks are 
coming under additional pressures in the post-fi-
nancial-crisis environment. While some of these 
additional pressures are not entirely new, they 
threaten to force central banks onto risky terrain. 
We highlight two sets of pressures: (a) the conse-
quences of high public and private debts; and (b) 
the perceived dangers of currency appreciation 
and overvaluation.
While manifestations of these pressures are already 
evident in individual countries, it is important to 
understand them as part of a broader global picture. 
We do so in the next two sections, which look at the 
consequences of high public and private debts in the 
advanced economies and at worries about currency 
misalignments and overvaluation in emerging mar-
kets, respectively. Following this positive analysis 
(which asks what kinds of new pressures central 
banks will find themselves subject to), we turn in 
the concluding section to the normative dimension 
(the question of how central banks should respond).
Central Banks and the Debt 
Overhang
High levels of public debt are likely to be the most 
enduring legacy of the 2007-2009 financial crises 
for the United States and other industrial econo-
mies. For many if not most advanced countries, 
concerns about those debt burdens will shape pol-
icy choices for years. Fiscal adjustment is painful 
in the short run, which makes it politically difficult 
to deliver. Debt restructuring, for its part, leaves a 
damaging stigma and is also often associated with 
deep recessions.
Importantly, debt overhangs are not limited to the 
public sector, as was the case following World War 
II, but include a high degree of leverage in the pri-
vate sector, especially in the financial industry and 
among households.22 The surge in domestic bank 
credit that occurred in most advanced economies 
in 1997-2007 has barely begun to unwind. The 
build-up in external leverage was even greater, 
with Iceland and Ireland recording gross external 
debt positions in excess of ten times their respec-
tive GDPs. The debt overhang and associated prob-
lems are common to most advanced economies.
An unsustainable path for the public debt ulti-
mately needs to be addressed. In some countries 
this will require an extended period of primary 
budget surpluses. In others it will require debt re-
structuring. The authorities will of course be reluc-
tant to term their actions restructuring; they will 
prefer the pretense that they are finding uniquely 
22 See Reinhart and Reinhart (2010). 
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advanced economy solutions for what are, in re-
ality, emerging market style sovereign debt crises. 
Just as in other debt crises-resolution episodes, 
their responses will include debt buybacks (as in 
Greece) and debt-equity swaps. 
Another option, which seemingly holds out the at-
traction of avoiding some of the aforementioned 
costs or at least spreading them over time, will be 
to attempt to limit the effective cost of debt by re-
quiring domestic financial institutions to hold it. 
While advanced economies are unlikely to call 
their policies financial repression when more po-
litically correct characterizations, such as pruden-
tial regulation, are available, they could move to 
a system more akin to what the global economy 
had prior to the 1980s market-based reforms. That 
system of domestic and external financial regula-
tion was instrumental in keeping real interest rates 
low (and often negative) and reducing advanced 
economies’ government debt levels from their re-
cord highs at the end of World War II.
Some recent moves suggest governments might 
attempt similar measures today. Basel III provides 
for the preferential treatment of government debt 
in bank balance sheets via substantial differentia-
tion (in favor of government debt) in capital re-
quirements. Other approaches may be even more 
direct. For example, at the height of the financial 
crisis, UK banks were required to hold a larger 
share of gilts in their portfolios. The IMF’s April 
2011 Global Financial Stability Report documents 
how Greek, Irish, and Portuguese banks have al-
ready liquidated a substantial fraction of their 
foreign assets and swapped those into domestic 
public debt.23 Evidently, the process whereby debts 
are being “placed” at below market interest rates 
in pension funds and other more captive domestic 
financial institutions is already under way. Spain 
has recently reintroduced a de facto form of inter-
est rate ceilings on bank deposits.24,25 At the same 
time, however, it remains to be seen whether gov-
ernments have the ability to go much further in 
today’s financially-sophisticated, high-capital-mo-
bility world.
If governments do embark on this path, central 
banks are likely to come under pressure to be part 
of this process, as they were in the period after 
World War II. In many countries, central banks 
are financial regulators, so the impetus for, or at 
least acquiescence to, measures compelling other 
financial institutions to hold government bonds 
will have to come from the central bank, and the 
central bank will come under political pressure to 
provide it. The central bank may also come under 
pressure to support bond prices—or equivalently, 
to cap interest rates on treasury bonds—as was the 
case in the United States prior to the Treasury-Fed-
eral Reserve Accord of 1951 that restored the Fed’s 
operational independence. The European Central 
Bank has already engaged in limited purchases of 
the government bonds of heavily indebted euro-
area countries and is under pressure (as we write) 
to undertake more, with the effect of transferring 
sovereign obligations onto its own balance sheet.
The normative question (which we address in the 
concluding section to this chapter) is whether, un-
der what circumstances, and how far the central 
bank should go down this road. As discussed ear-
lier, the conceit behind central bank independence 
and inflation targeting is that monetary policy 
23  See Figure 1.17 in that report. The question of course being the extent to which this reflects regulation, public pressure, or private incentives.
24 See http://www.lavanguardia.mobi/mobi/noticia/54140090670/El-Gobierno-limita-las-superofertas-de-depositos-bancarios-con-mas-
exigencias.html
25  Our discussion has focused primarily on Western Europe, but similar trends are emerging in Eastern Europe. Pension reform adopted by 
the Polish parliament in March of this year has met with criticism from employers’ federations and business circles. According to the Polish 
Confederation of Private Employers Lewiatansay, the proposal seeks to hide part of the state’s debt by grabbing the money of the insured and 
passing the buck to future governments. The confederation also points out that moving money from pension funds to ZUS will protect the 
government from having to change the definition of public debt and exceed financial safety thresholds, but will expose future retirees to losses. 
Struggling with budgetary pressure at home, Hungary has nationalized its pre-funded pension schemes and excluded the cost of the reforms 
from their public debt figures. Bulgaria has taken measures in the same direction.
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can and should target price stability alone, while 
other economic objectives are best addressed with 
other instruments and by other agencies. But in a 
second-best world, where other instruments are 
ineffective or constrained and where uncertainty 
prevails, this neat separation breaks down. Under 
these circumstances, central bankers need to ask 
whether, inter alia, undertaking bond purchases, 
while creating moral hazard for their governments, 
interfering with the conduct of conventional mon-
etary policy, and sending mixed messages, is better 
or worse than standing by idly and potentially forc-
ing the debt to be restructured, already weak banks 
to take a haircut, and—in the worst case should be 
joined—financial market meltdown to occur. 
This debate has taken on a particularly sharp edge 
in the context of the unfolding European sovereign 
debt crisis. As the public discussions among dif-
ferent official players in that context vividly illus-
trate, the right answers are far from obvious and 
outcomes are intimately tied to political rather 
than just economic considerations. It is also un-
likely that the same answer to these questions will 
be correct under all circumstances.
Central bankers face a difficult dilemma. The 
more they take these competing objectives 
on board, the more they depart from the in-
tellectual framework that guides their action, 
and the more complicated their task becomes. 
But when they overlook such spillovers in the 
name of monetary purity, they begin to be 
viewed as part of the problem and they risk 
undermining the political consensus that un-
derpins their independence.
Dealing with Currency Misalignments and 
Overvaluation
Another area where this dilemma is experienced is 
in the relationship between monetary policy and 
trade competitiveness. Central banks frequently 
come under pressure from exporters, industrial-
ists, and agricultural interests who complain that 
the central bank’s focus on domestic price stability 
and neglect of the exchange rate comes at the ex-
pense of the profitability of key sectors. In emerg-
ing markets, the typical pattern is for an upswing 
in expectations to cause capital inflows that in turn 
strengthen the exchange rate, squeezing tradable 
economic activities. In advanced countries, similar 
problems can arise as a result of safe-haven flows 
and economic problems abroad (see the recent 
cases of Switzerland and Japan). 
Central banks have traditionally responded to cap-
ital inflows with sterilized intervention and various 
forms of capital-account regulation. But sterilized 
intervention that results in the build-up of reserves 
is costly and ultimately self-defeating when finan-
cial markets are open. Unsterilized intervention 
(a form of quantitative easing) may help where 
there is no existing problem of inflation (Switzer-
land, Japan), but it is problematic in the boom-
ing emerging-market setting, where inflation and 
overheating risk already exist (see, however, Tur-
key for an experiment along these lines). There has 
been an increased tendency therefore in emerging 
markets to resort to controls of various types. Now 
that such measures are no longer under attack by 
the IMF, more countries have become willing to 
discuss and institute them: Brazil, Thailand, and 
Korea being cases in point.
It is easy to dismiss pressure from exporters as self-
interested lobbying. However, there may also be 
some broader validity to their claims. The share of 
employment in manufactures tends to shrink as a 
country moves through middle- and high-income 
status. But very sharp appreciation of the exchange 
rate can accelerate that process, with disruptive 
effects. Workers with industry-specific skills and 
training may find it hard to redeploy them else-
where. A long-standing comparative advantage 
can be undermined. Recall, for example, discus-
sions of how the high dollar in the mid-1980s was 
creating a Rust Belt in the Midwest and of how 
a strong franc currently threatens to hollow out 
Swiss industry.
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Some of these arguments seem to apply with even 
greater force to emerging markets and develop-
ing countries. Manufactures, modern services, 
and non-traditional agriculture are critically im-
portant for economic growth in these countries. 
Countries that have initiated and sustained mod-
ern economic growth have often done so on the 
back of successful expansion of exports. This has 
required the promotion of tradables through the 
adoption of supportive policies.
One economic rationale for emphasizing tradables 
is that the obstacles that impede structural trans-
formation affect predominantly modern, high-
productivity economic activities that are tradable.26 
Such obstacles can take the form of government 
failures, for example weaknesses in property rights 
and contract enforcement. Or they can come in the 
form of market failures, such as learning externali-
ties or coordination failures. The first, best response 
is to eliminate these underlying distortions, but this 
is often easier said than done. Alternatively, sec-
ond-best policies promoting tradables ensure that 
resources move from low- to high-productivity ac-
tivities, generating economic growth in the process.
This has been China’s recent growth strategy, as 
well as that of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
other East Asian tigers before it. In contrast, coun-
tries experiencing shrinkage in non-traditional 
tradables, such as those in Latin America after 
1990, have had low rates of economy-wide produc-
tivity growth. Even for emerging markets that have 
followed a less explicit export-led growth strategy 
than those in Asia, the trend toward sustained real 
exchange rate appreciation has rekindled old con-
cerns about the “Dutch disease” consequences.
The structure of production depends on the rela-
tive profitability of different activities.The real 
exchange rate, as the relative price of tradables 
to non-tradables, may therefore shape structur-
al transformation and set the pace of economic 
growth.The question is how much weight central 
banks should attach to the impact of their policies 
on the real exchange rate.
In principle they can take refuge in the dichotomy 
between nominal and real exchange rates and ar-
gue that the conduct of monetary policy has impli-
cations for the first but not the second. The real ex-
change rate is an endogenous relative price deter-
mined by real quantities, namely the balance be-
tween domestic saving and domestic investment. 
Under textbook conditions, the competitiveness of 
tradables can be divorced from monetary policy.
There are two counter-arguments, one empirical 
and the other conceptual. The empirical point is that 
prices tend to be stickier than the exchange rate, as 
a result of which nominal and real exchange rates 
tend to move together. Exporters who see the nomi-
nal value of the domestic currency rise can be pretty 
certain that this will have an adverse impact on their 
profitability over time horizons they care about.
The conceptual point is that economies with large 
amounts of surplus labor have quasi-Keynesian 
features, allowing monetary policy to have real ef-
fects. An excess supply of labor in rural areas (or 
informality) pins down the (nominal) wage rate at 
the margin at some low level. Since wages are a key 
determinant of non-tradable-goods prices, an in-
crease in the nominal money supply can then raise 
the relative price of tradables to non-tradables (i.e., 
depreciate the real exchange rate) and have real ef-
fects. The Chinese economy provided a potential 
illustration until recently, when labor shortages 
began to produce wage increases.
Whether or not an undervalued real exchange rate 
is useful for promoting structural change in emerg-
ing market economies (a point about which there 
is no consensus among authors of this report), it 
has a major disadvantage. An undervalued curren-
cy taxes the consumption of tradables (along with 
26 See Rodrik (2008). 
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subsidizing their production) and so produces a 
trade surplus. Other countries must therefore be 
willing to run the counterpart deficits on their trade 
account. Before the financial crisis, the United States 
and some other industrial countries were willing 
to do so. But as demonstrated by the debate over 
“global imbalances,” the effects may not have been 
entirely benign, and the advanced countries may no 
longer be happy to resume their traditional role.
This also points to a distinction between small 
and large countries. A small country that seeks to 
maintain an undervalued exchange rate can do so 
without significant implications for global imbal-
ances and the associated financial risks. Its poli-
cies will also have only minor implications for the 
competitiveness of its emerging market neighbors. 
For a large country, this kind of active use of ex-
change rate policy is more problematic on both 
grounds. This distinction also points to a potential 
fallacy of composition: what could work for an in-
dividual country may become problematic for the 
world when pursued by countries as a group.
One alternative to using monetary-cum-exchange-
rate policy to promote growth-friendly structural 
change in the direction of producing exportables 
is of course to subsidize tradables directly or re-
duce input costs. Such policies can in principle be 
effective in promoting structural change, and if 
they are combined with macroeconomic policies 
that maintain external balance, they need not be 
associated with trade surpluses.27 However, such 
policies run afoul of World Trade Organization 
(WTO) rules and the Agreement on Subsidies, in 
particular, which prevent emerging market econ-
omies from utilizing explicit or implicit export 
subsidies. Tax exemptions, directed credit, payroll 
subsidies, investment subsidies, domestic content 
requirements, and export processing zones are all 
potentially actionable under WTO rules.28
Such policies also face well-known difficulties of 
implementation. Interventions may be poorly 
targeted and subject to political capture and rent-
seeking. Currency policy, because it works across 
the board, is less prone to capture by specific in-
dustrial lobbies. For all these reasons, it is an in-
escapable reality that governments have tried to 
maintain an undervalued currency as a key ele-
ment of their growth strategy. 
The pressure on central banks to keep an eye on 
competitiveness can be intense. Inflation targeting 
that pays little attention to the level or volatility of 
the exchange rate becomes harder to practice. Cen-
tral banks are more likely to safeguard their indepen-
dence by acknowledging such concerns and press-
ing for non-monetary policy measures that achieve 
similar aims than by playing the game “who, me?” 
That means, in turn, greater cooperation and coordi-
nation with fiscal and regulatory authorities to create 
the conditions for a more competitive real exchange 
rate. Fiscal policy needs to be tight enough to allow 
the currency to settle on a lower trajectory. Regula-
tors need to be willing to tighten prudential liquidity 
requirements and capital-account measures when 
too much money is flowing in. Central banks can 
signal their willingness to watch (if not “target”) the 
exchange rate, as long as other parts of the econom-
ic-policy machinery are doing their respective bits.
The point that not all countries can simultaneously 
run trade surpluses obviously still stands. From a 
systemic standpoint, while policies designed to 
prevent currency overvaluation are not objection-
able, those targeting large undervaluations and 
trade surpluses certainly are. Similarly, there is an 
element of externality in capital controls in that 
one country’s success in evading capital inflows 
only increases the difficulty of other countries do-
ing the same. This is certainly a problem at the 
level of emerging markets as a group.
27  A production subsidy on tradables produces an incipient trade surplus, which can be eliminated by allowing the currency to appreciate. The 
appreciation does not remove the production stimulus on tradables entirely as long as tradables consumption is sensitive to the exchange rate. 
See Rodrik (2010).  
28 Least developed countries are exempt from these rules.
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What Should Central Banks Do?
We have enumerated a number of additional pres-
sures that central banks will face in the post-crisis 
economic environment. These will make it dif-
ficult for them to implement their policies using 
a traditional framework in which price stability is 
the overarching goal. Unavoidably, they will be-
come entangled in debates over public debt and 
its management and come under pressure to do 
something to help maintain competitiveness in the 
production of tradables.
While the two sets of issues arise most immediately 
in different sets of economies—high public and pri-
vate debts are mainly a problem for the advanced 
economies, while exchange rate overvaluation is 
largely a worry for emerging markets (although 
Japan and Switzerland are currently experienc-
ing difficulties)—they are related. While emerging 
markets may increasingly look to financial regula-
tory measures to keep international capital “out” 
during periods of surging capital inflows, advanced 
economies have incentives to keep capital “in” and 
create a domestic captive audience to facilitate fi-
nancing for the high existing levels of public debt.
 
Concerned about overheating, inflationary pres-
sures, and competitiveness issues, emerging 
market economies may, in some cases, welcome 
changes in the regulatory landscape that keep fi-
nancial flows bottled up in advanced economies 
rather than let them spill across borders. This cre-
ates the possibility that advanced and emerging 
market economies may at some point meet on the 
common ground of increased regulation and/or 
restrictions on international financial flows and, 
more broadly, on returning to a more tightly regu-
lated domestic financial environment.
This much is positive analysis. We turn now to the 
normative question of how central banks might 
handle these difficult burdens placed on them.
A first point is that central banks are more likely 
to safeguard their independence and credibility 
by acknowledging the tensions between inflation 
targeting and competing objectives than by deny-
ing such linkages and proceeding with business 
as usual. Central bank independence ultimately 
rests on political consensus—on the convergence 
of views among leading political interests that so-
ciety’s broader economic goals are best served by 
this independence. A central bank perceived as 
insensitive to problems of debt sustainability and 
exchange rate overvaluation is likely to be dragged 
into bruising political battles and will not be able 
to maintain its independence for long. This does 
not mean that central banks must become debt-
managers’ and development ministers’ poodles, but 
neither can they aspire to the purity of driven snow.
Exceptional circumstances might require excep-
tional responses. In those circumstances, it is 
crucial that the central bank clearly communi-
cate what it is doing and why, and how its actions 
are consistent with its broader policy framework. 
When taking unconventional steps to support the 
market in sovereign bonds, central banks need 
to make clear the rationale for their action. If the 
justification is disorderly conditions in the market 
due to temporary liquidity problems or panic, its 
purchases are likely to be temporary and should 
be explained as such. If the action is designed to 
help give the government extended breathing 
space so it can put in place a package of adjust-
ment measures to revive the economy and grow 
out from under the debt burden, purchases may 
have to continue for a lengthier period, and again 
this should be explained.
 
An example of what not to do can be seen in the 
case of the European Central Bank, which resumed 
purchasing peripheral euro-area bonds without 
adequately explaining why it was following this 
course of action. Not surprisingly, its initial action 
did not restore confidence.
On the exchange rate overvaluation front, cen-
tral banks will have to devise a communication 
strategy that acknowledges the importance of the 
level and volatility of the exchange rate, without 
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committing to use foreign exchange market inter-
vention or capital controls as the primary instru-
ment to maintain external competitiveness. This will 
allow them to take actions to prevent exchange rate 
overshooting in exceptional circumstances without 
departing from the inflation targeting framework.
Central banks should also make clear, however, 
that monetary policy is only one part of the policy 
response. Bond purchases without fiscal and struc-
tural adjustment achieve nothing. Maintaining a 
stable and fairly valued real exchange rate is not 
exclusively the responsibility of the central bank; 
achieving this goal and deriving benefits from it 
also require prudent fiscal policies, sound macro-
prudential supervision, and, where necessary, reg-
ulation of the capital account. The message from 
central banks has to be: we are willing to keep an 
eye on the currency with the goal of preventing 
overvaluation as long as the fiscal and regulatory 
authorities are fulfilling their part of the bargain 
as well. Making the quid pro quo with the govern-
ment explicit not only educates the public, it helps 
deflect pressure from the central bank. 
Similarly, with regard to the challenges posed by 
debt overhangs, particularly those of the public 
sector, a communication strategy that addresses re-
curring concerns about the central bank’s indepen-
dence from the fiscal authorities will be crucial in 
maintaining credibility. More transparency on the 
policy objectives and strategy are especially valuable 
in periods (such as that now being experienced by 
the Federal Reserve) when a very expansive policy 
stance is observationally equivalent to monetization 
of the debt. 
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CHAPTER 5
Rethinking Central Banking
T
here is an emerging consensus that the frame-
work underpinning modern central bank-
ing must be rethought. A monetary policy 
framework focusing on price stability and output 
growth will also affect financial stability through 
its impact on asset valuations, commodity prices, 
credit, leverage, capital flows, and exchange rates. 
One country’s monetary policy can spill over to 
other countries, especially when central banks fol-
low inconsistent frameworks, with cross-border 
capital flows serving as the transmission channel. 
All this suggests that the conventional framework 
for central banking is inadequate. It is too narrow 
to meet domestic and global needs. 
There may be broad consensus on this point, but 
there is still little agreement about the particulars 
of the new framework. It is those particulars that 
we seek to elaborate in this chapter.
Monetary Policy and Financial Stability
1. Financial stability should be an explicit 
mandate of central banks. Other micro- 
and macroprudential policies should be 
deployed first, wherever possible, in the 
pursuit of financial stability, but monetary 
policy should be regarded as a legitimate 
part of the macroprudential supervisors’ 
toolkit. 
2. When rapid credit growth or other indi-
cators of financial excess accompany as-
set price increases, the authorities should 
employ stress tests to measure the effects 
of changes in credit conditions on asset 
prices, economic activity, and financial 
stability. Instead of seeking to identify 
bubbles, the authorities should simply 
ask whether current financing conditions 
are raising the likelihood of sharp rever-
sals in asset prices that are disruptive to 
economic activity. 
3. Where the answer to the aforementioned 
question is yes, central bankers should 
then lean against the wind using a combi-
nation of the tools at their disposal, turn-
ing first to nonmonetary micro- and mac-
roprudential tools, but also to monetary 
policy tools when necessary. If this results 
in periods when, in the interests of finan-
cial stability, the central bank sets policies 
that could result in deviations from its in-
flation target, then so be it.
4. Responsibility for the maintenance of fi-
nancial stability can be assigned either 
to the central bank or to a self-standing 
financial supervisory authority. But in 
both setups, close coordination between 
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the central bank and other agencies that 
contribute to ensuring the stability of fi-
nancial conditions is essential. This is par-
ticularly important when policy makers 
have to evaluate the trade-offs between 
the use of monetary tools and prudential 
measures, and make decisions on the ap-
propriate mix.
5. Central banks already require substan-
tial operational independence in order to 
pursue their mandates. They will require 
even greater independence when a finan-
cial stability objective is added to those 
mandates. They will, in turn, have to es-
tablish the legitimacy of their actions in 
circumstances where the nature of threats 
to financial stability is poorly understood. 
The public and its elected representatives 
may not be happy, for example, if the cen-
tral bank curbs credit growth in the inter-
est of financial stability, causing asset pric-
es to fall. This makes it important for the 
central bank to clearly communicate its 
assessment of the risks and the rationale 
for its policy actions. It needs to explain 
how it seeks to balance the objectives of 
price stability, output stability, and finan-
cial stability. Better communication and 
greater clarity on how the central bank 
will be held accountable for its broader 
mandate are necessary to defend central 
bank independence. Independence is po-
litically viable only with accountability, 
and the best way to enhance accountabil-
ity is for central banks to become more 
transparent and forthright about their 
objectives and tactics.
6. The spillover effects of a central bank’s 
policies in other countries are a legitimate 
concern. At present, central banks do little 
to internalize these effects. Admittedly, 
they may have difficulty in justifying ac-
tions taken in the effort to do so to do-
mestic political authorities. This tension 
points to the need for further changes in 
prevailing policy framework. Specifically:
(i) Domestic political authorities should 
be persuaded to allow such consid-
erations to play an explicit role in 
the central bank’s monetary policy 
framework in large economies.
 
(ii) Large-country central banks should 
pay more attention to their collec-
tive policy stance and its global im-
plications. Where appropriate, they 
should consider coordinated action 
to help stabilize the global economy 
in times of stress.
 
(iii) These recommendations are unlikely 
to be implemented in isolation. We 
therefore propose that a small group 
of systemically significant central 
banks, perhaps called the Interna-
tional Monetary Policy Committee, 
should meet regularly under the 
auspices of the Committee on the 
Global Financial System of the BIS. 
This group would discuss and assess 
the implications of their policies for 
global liquidity, leverage, and ex-
posures, and the appropriateness of 
their joint money and credit poli-
cies from the point of view of global 
price, output, and financial stability. 
Although central bank governors already meet 
regularly at the BIS, we recommend a substantial 
upgrade for our proposed committee from the 
current informal and closed-door format. Com-
munication of central bank actions is important 
at the global level, just as it is for a domestic au-
dience. In some ways, it is more important, since 
the global spillovers and coordination can be dis-
cussed explicitly. For this reason, the committee 
should periodically issue a report assessing and 
justifying their policies from this global perspec-
tive, pointing out areas of dissent or inconsistency. 
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The report should be submitted to the Group of 
Twenty and released more broadly with a formal 
public presentation.29
Central bankers will of course insist they have no 
control over one another. Some will claim that such 
matters are already discussed informally at BIS 
meetings or formally at the G20 meetings. How-
ever, the current BIS format is not conducive to ac-
countability, and the current G20 format gives pre-
cedence to heads of government and finance min-
isters, not central bank governors. The discussion 
that takes place at the margins of the G20 meetings 
is informal. For these reasons, a separate forum is 
needed. The need to issue periodic public reports 
can help central bankers identify and publicly air 
the inconsistencies in their policies. With time, this 
should encourage them to internalize some of the 
external consequences of their policies.
The kind of report we have in mind can inform a 
broader discussion of how the mandates of large 
central banks can be altered so as to minimize 
the adverse spillover effects of their policies, even 
while their responsibilities continue to be domes-
tic. It would have the ancillary benefit of stimulat-
ing research on the definition, determinants, and 
means of control of global liquidity, a notion that 
nowadays remains a very abstract and ill-defined 
concept in policy discussions.
Macroprudential Supervision under the 
proposed framework
Enhancing financial stability will require supple-
menting traditional micro-prudential measures 
with macroprudential tools.
1. Regulatory guidance on loan to value 
(LTV) and debt service to income (DTI) 
ratios over the cycle is useful for damp-
ening credit booms. Countercyclical and 
contingent capital requirements, dynamic 
provisioning, liquidity buffers, and taxes 
on short-term funds borrowed by finan-
cial institutions are additional possible 
instruments. Given that there is still little 
evidence on the relative effectiveness and 
costs of each of these tools, authorities will 
have to learn by doing and from shared 
experience. 
2. Supervisors will need to identify direct 
and indirect exposures and linkages, cross 
border as well as domestic. They need to 
identify institutions or trades where ac-
tivity is disproportionately concentrated 
(for example, on interbank derivative ex-
posures). While they should collect such 
data for their own supervisory needs, they 
should also release that information, in ag-
gregated form, to the broader public, in-
cluding market participants. Broader dis-
semination will allow market participants 
to better manage risks, and in turn allow 
the public to better monitor supervisory 
behavior.
3. Cross-border surveillance of conditions 
pertinent to financial stability should 
be part of the mandate of the IMF, FSB, 
and BIS. Such institutions should work in 
concert with domestic macroprudential 
supervisory authorities to collect and dis-
seminate information across countries on 
global exposures and risks, as well as ex-
perience with macroprudential tools.
4. Macroprudential tools will be more ef-
fective if coordinated and implemented 
29  Multilateral institutions like the IMF should also, of course, continue to analyze the spillover effects of large-country policies—as part of the 
Mutual Assessment Process (MAP), Article IV consultations, and the World Economic Outlook and Global Financial Stability Reports—and 
use these in evaluating a country’s overall policy stance. The IMF’s newly instituted “spillover reports” are an obvious vehicle for carrying out 
this charge. The IMF should also analyze the collective policy stance of large central banks, and this report could be the starting point for the 
central bankers’ discussions and report. The G-20 needs to develop a mechanism for using these reports to influence domestic assessments of 
central bank performance.
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across countries to dampen credit and 
leverage cycles. The IMF or a beefed up 
FSB/BIS should have the mandate to as-
sess financial stability risks across borders 
and make recommendations to national 
supervisors on the level at which to set a 
relevant macroprudential tool.
5. Some countries will benefit more than 
others from the use of macroprudential 
tools and may also face lower costs of im-
plementation. Coordination may be espe-
cially hard, however, when different coun-
tries see very different costs and benefits. 
This suggests the multilateral institution 
responsible for assessing financial stability 
should:
a. Persuade all countries to put macro-
prudential measures on the books, 
even if the measures are initially lev-
ied at zero rates.
b. Focus less on coordination at the ini-
tial stages, which will allow experi-
ence to be built up on the use of the 
tools in different settings.
c. Encourage supervisory authorities to 
expend greater effort to find tools that 
are lower cost relative to efficacy and 
therefore more widely acceptable.
d. Encourage greater dialogue as sys-
temic risks build up so as to create the 
possibility of greater coordination.
6. The importance of cross-border spillovers 
associated with intermediation practices 
and conditions of systemically relevant fi-
nancial institutions (SIFIs) was highlight-
ed by the recent crisis. Macroprudential 
tools tailored to contain these risks include 
significantly higher capital buffers for SI-
FIs (the new Swiss regime proposes about 
19%), contingent capital requirements, 
and possibly a Financial Stability Con-
tribution along the lines proposed by the 
IMF. While a start in implementing these 
measures should be made now, the precise 
form of such levies should be allowed to 
develop in light of experience. Unfortu-
nately, because any such standard will be 
subject to extensive lobbying, the ideal re-
quirement may be hard to attain, and the 
initial standards likely to be sticky. This 
suggests building flexibility into the initial 
standards so there are alternative ways to 
meet the requirements.
 
7. Although there has been some progress 
on cross-border supervision (through the 
creation of colleges of supervisors, for ex-
ample), there has been little progress on 
mechanisms for resolving failures of cross-
border financial institutions. Efforts to 
harmonize national bankruptcy and reso-
lution regimes should therefore be redou-
bled. Explicit loss-sharing protocols need 
to be negotiated, informed by the (soon-
to-be-written) living wills of large cross-
border banks.30 If no progress is made in 
addressing cross-border spillovers, coun-
tries will be inclined to protect themselves 
by mandating that foreign institutions 
place their domestic activities into sepa-
rately incorporated and capitalized domes-
tic subsidiaries, thereby partially reversing 
the globalization of finance. The commit-
tee recognizes that this is a second-best op-
tion, and while it may be what the world 
will settle for, urges the regulatory com-
munity to be more ambitious.
 
8. Even vigorous countercyclical macropru-
dential measures such as those recom-
mended here cannot neutralize the effects 
of incompatible macroeconomic policies. 
In a number of situations, macroeconomic 
30  A living will is a document prepared by the bank that explains to its supervisors where its assets and liabilities are, and how they will be sorted 
out in a bankruptcy. 
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policies such as low interest rates on one 
side of a border and exchange-rate target-
ing on the other can give rise to destabi-
lizing cross-border capital flows. To the 
extent that these are problematic for fi-
nancial stability, it is important for multi-
lateral institutions to point to the incom-
patibility of macro-economic policies and 
press countries to make them more con-
sistent instead of forcing countries to rely 
solely on macroprudential measures.31
 
9. More progress is needed on reducing the 
uncertainties surrounding the availabil-
ity of liquidity facilities for dealing with 
systemic crises—such as bilateral swaps 
between central banks, regional liquidity 
pooling arrangements, and IMF facilities. 
While there may be an element of moral 
hazard associated with guaranteeing ac-
cess to such facilities, financial stability 
may require them to be “on the shelf ”—
that is, to be ready for use if a crisis hits. 
At the very least, some efforts to aggregate 
the likely availability of such facilities and 
set them against potential needs should 
become part of the multilateral stability 
surveillance process.
Exchange Rates and Capital Controls 
Many developing countries have found it helpful 
to intervene in the foreign exchange market as a 
way of encouraging exports and labor-intensive 
manufacturing. However, this practice can create 
problems for the global system when the country 
or countries concerned are large, either individu-
ally or collectively. This leads us to the following 
recommendations.
1. Countries need to recognize that such 
policies are not without significant costs 
for their own economies and should 
move away from such policies over time. 
Even when such policies may be in their 
narrow short-term national self-interest, 
they should be encouraged by the inter-
national community to move away from 
them because of their implications for the 
global system.
2. This is not, however, an argument for an 
immediate transition to a freely floating 
exchange rate. Short-run interventions 
in the foreign exchange market that af-
ford time to adjust may be justified. Oc-
casional interventions that smooth out 
temporary exchange rate fluctuations that 
threaten serious dislocations may also be 
justified when the temporary nature of the 
shock and the costs of sharp exchange rate 
changes are firmly established. 
3. Controls on capital inflows whose main 
effect is to enhance financial stability, 
by preventing the build-up of currency 
or maturity mismatches or limiting the 
growth of intermediation through the do-
mestic banking sector, have a useful role 
when other policy tools are not available 
or less than fully effective in addressing 
these problems. International standards 
should allow rare interventions in the for-
eign exchange market and temporary, fi-
nancial stability-oriented capital controls 
while discouraging the use of measures 
that attempt permanently to distort the 
pattern of comparative advantage. In step 
with the reassessment of capital controls, 
blanket strictures against controls in bilat-
eral investment treaties, European Union 
rules, and OECD guidelines need to be 
revisited. 
4. Such measures will be more effective when 
applied uniformly to domestic and foreign 
institutions. Applying them differentially 
can give rise to opportunities for evading 
31 For instance, this could be one of the tasks of the small committee of systemically significant central bankers proposed earlier. 
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these measures through cross-bank trans-
actions.
5. Policy makers should recognize the limita-
tions, fiscal costs, and distortionary effects 
of instruments such as intervention in for-
eign exchange markets and even selective 
capital controls, especially when used for 
sustained periods. They should not see 
them as substitutes for structural reform 
and macroeconomic policy adjustment. 
6. When a number of countries undertake 
measures to intervene in foreign exchange 
markets, this should be taken as a signal to 
the proposed committee of central bank-
ers that there are policy inconsistencies at 
the international level that need to be ad-
dressed. These discussions could improve 
the likelihood of collective solutions that 
minimize adverse spillovers, or at least 
reduce the possibility of tit-for-tat escala-
tion—for instance, through trade restric-
tions or competitive devaluations—that 
leads to worse collective outcomes. 
7. Cash-strapped governments will be tempt-
ed to use prudential measures to capture 
domestic sources of financing (via statu-
tory liquidity requirements on banks man-
dating the holding of domestic govern-
ment bonds, for example). Such practices 
are likely to become increasingly prevalent 
as governments grapple with the budgetary 
consequences of high post-financial-crisis 
debt ratios. This makes it important to rec-
ognize that these measures come with risks. 
They can lead to greater risk concentration 
(as, for example, when domestic banks be-
come exposed to an insolvent government), 
something that could prove costly to the 
global community when the country needs 
foreign support. Moreover, long-term bar-
riers to cross-border capital movements 
divert capital flows into less transparent 
channels, making it harder to undertake 
adequate supervision.
Conclusion
Our objective in this report has been to lay out 
a roadmap for central banking in the post-crisis 
world, where financial stability can no longer 
be seen as outside the ambit of monetary policy, 
cross-border spillovers have increased in scope 
and size, and central banks have come under new 
pressures. The report sets out a strategy for incor-
porating financial stability concerns in the imple-
mentation of monetary policy without diluting the 
price-stability objective. It proposes institutional 
mechanisms for dealing with tensions caused by 
cross-border spillovers of inconsistent domesti-
cally-oriented policies. Finally, it describes how 
central banks are under pressure from a variety of 
new mandates and constraints imposed on them 
by other policies and institutional structures and 
what they should do about it. 
We, of course, recognize that practical central 
banking differs from the theoretical ideal of flexible 
inflation targeting and that it may already incorpo-
rate some of what we suggest. Still, a framework is 
needed to articulate and better guide central bank-
ing in the more complicated and interconnected 
world that we now live in, especially in light of the 
lessons learned from the global financial crisis. 
By tracing the connections among different facets 
of central banking, we have attempted to create a 
broader framework and set out some concrete pro-
posals for making progress. 
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